

THE MODELS OF FORMATION OF COALITION GOVERNMENTS AND COOPERATION OF THEIR PARTICIPANTS IN MULTIPARTY CONDITIONS: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL MANIFESTATIONS

The article is dedicated to theoretical and practical analyzing the models of formation of coalition governments and cooperation of their participants in multiparty conditions. This was based on the pre-assumption that the rules and traditions served by coalitions'/protocoalitions' partners in negotiating coalition governments are quite similar or organized under similar schemes and principles. And this is true in functional and macroscopic terms. However, in the course of the analysis it was stated that institutionally and non-institutionally coalition governments differ microscopically, in particular on the basis of the use of different models of formation and different mechanisms of cooperation of the participants. Thus, it was generalized that coalition governments need to be talked about in a diversified way, in particular through different approaches to explaining them and taking into account the different national specificities of their practical approbation. In one case, such governments are more predetermined by nominal rules and institutions, and in the other case they are predominantly dependent on party-determined factors.

Keywords: government, governmental cabinet, coalition government, multi-party system, formation of a coalition government, distribution of ministerial posts.

Славоміра Бялоблoцка

МОДЕЛІ ФОРМУВАННЯ КОАЛІЦІЙНИХ УРЯДІВ І СПІВПРАЦІ ЇХНІХ УЧАСНИКІВ В УМОВАХ БАГАТОПАРТІЙНОСТІ: ТЕОРЕТИЧНІ Й ПРАКТИЧНІ ВИЯВИ

У теоретичному та практичному розрізі проаналізовано моделі формування коаліційних урядів і співпраці їхніх учасників в умовах багатопартійності. Це здійснено з огляду на попереднє припущення, згідно з яким правила та традиції, якими послуговуються гіпотетичні партнери коаліцій/протокоаліцій при веденні переговорів про формування коаліційних урядів, доволі схожі або організуються за подібними схемами і принципами. І це вірно у функціональному й макроскопічному розрізі. Однак в ході аналізу констатовано, що інституційно та позаінституційно коаліційні уряди різняться мікроскопічно, зокрема

на підставі застосування різних моделей формування та різних механізмів співпраці учасників. Відтак узагальнено, що про коаліційні уряди треба говорити диверсифіковано, зокрема в рамках різних підходів до їхнього пояснення та в рамках врахування різної національної специфіки їхньої апробації на практиці. В одному випадку уряди більше зумовлені номінальними правилами й інститутами, а в іншому випадку переважно залежать від партійно дестермінованих чинників.

Ключові слова: уряд, урядовий кабінет, коаліційний уряд, багатопартійна система, формування коаліційного уряду, розподіл міністерських посад.

Among the most striking peculiarities of coalitional governments forming in countries with multi-party systems is an almost absolute lack of serious and systematic differences between them. Despite varying from country to country, are different in each country, the rules and traditions of government-forming, applied by the hypothetical coalition / proto-coalition partners in negotiating coalitional government cabinets are extremely resembling or rather governed by similar schemes and principles. It can be regarded as a theoretical prerequisite for pointing out several models, or even theories of coalitional governments forming and the cooperation of their members in multiparty conditions. However, this process cannot be boiled down to a single scheme, unilaterally allowing to verify different options for coalition governments forming. The point is that virtually all the empirical calculations and considerations regarding the formation of government coalitions are represented by either special studies of coalition bargaining or by mere comparisons of the number of coalition governments formed on the basis different models and theories. In addition, political comparative studies do not always use reliable statistical material to identify a valid set of variables and indicators that undoubtedly determine the formation of different types of coalition governments. Therefore, the proposed study argues that it is advisable to follow some of the most tested and valid theories of coalition governments formation as well as the cooperation of their members in multiparty environments, instead of limiting them to a single synthetic one.

These arguments come as no surprise in view of a wide array of research in this domain. The fact is that owing to explorations of such scientists, as R. Andeweg¹, A. De Swaan², W. Gamson³, M. Hallerberg⁴, D.-H. Kim and G. Loewenberg⁵, M. Laver⁶, L. Martin, R. Stevenson and G.

¹ Andeweg R., Ministers as double agents? The delegation process between cabinet and ministers, *European Journal of Political Research* 2000, vol 37, s. 377–395.

² De Swaan A., *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation*, Wyd. Elsevier 1973.

³ Gamson W., A Theory of Coalition Formation, *American Sociological Review* 1981, vol 26, s. 373–382.

⁴ Hallerberg M., *The Role of Parliamentary Committees in the Budgetary Process within Europe*, [w:] Strauch R., von Hagen J. (eds.), *Institutions, Politics and Fiscal Policy*, Wyd. Kluwer 2000, s. 87–106.

⁵ Kim D.-H., Loewenberg G., The Role of Parliamentary Committees in Coalition Governments: Keeping Tabs on Coalition Partners in the German Bundestag, *Comparative Political Studies* 2005, vol 38, s. 1104–1129.

⁶ Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1990.; Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and Breaking Governments*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

Vanberg⁷, W. Müller and K. Strøm⁸, W. Riker⁹, M. Thies¹⁰, I. von Neumann i O. Morgenstern¹¹, etc, it is apparent that all the existing theories and models of forming coalition governments and their participants cooperation in multiparty conditions are largely heterogeneous, and therefore unlikely to be synthesized, being based on different theoretical and methodological principles and focusing on diverse expectations and assumptions about coalition governments.

An overview of the scientific legacy of comparative political studies suggests that it is expedient to identify at least two groups of theoretical and methodological approaches, outlining the issues of coalition governments forming and cooperation of their participants in multiparty conditions. The first group of approaches is referred to as the non-institutional or “without institutions” approach, while the second is regarded as the institutional or “within-institutions-and-with institutions” approach. Therefore, the constant competition of the two groups of approaches has largely determined the elaboration of various theoretical models of coalition government formation and the cooperation of their participants in multiparty conditions, even though the former (non-institutional approach) evolved earlier than the latter.

It goes without saying that proponents of the non-institutional approach have traditionally sought to explain and foresee the process of forming coalition governments solely through application of analytical perspectives and models, claiming that political parties, motivated by their short or long-term goals are the determining agents of this process. Accordingly, followers of the non-institutional approach assume that any model of coalition government formation can always be applied to any specific case of coalition-forming, which, in their opinion, allows to interpret any hypothetical agreement about the formation and performance of a coalition government irrespective of the historically established circumstances. One of the most well-known outcomes of the non-institutional approach appears to be a minimum victory hypothesis, initially proposed by I. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern in “*Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*”¹², and later revised and slightly modified by W. Riker in his work “*The Theory of Political Coalitions*”¹³. Afterwards W. Gamson successfully applied this hypothesis to explain coalition government forming processes in the treatise “*A Theory of Coalition Formation*”¹⁴. This hypothesis claims that providing parties form a coalition cabinet in order to obtain the maximum number

⁷ Martin L., Stevenson R., *An Empirical Model of Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. University of Rochester 1996; Martin L., Vanberg G., Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review, “*American Political Science Review*” 2004, vol 99, s. 93–106.

⁸ Müller W., *Austria: Tight Coalitions and Stable Government*, [w:] Müller W., Strøm K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000; Müller W., Strøm K., *Coalition Governance in Western Europe: An Introduction*, [w:] Müller W., Strøm K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 1–31; Müller W., Strøm K., *Schlu.: Koalitionsregierungen und die Praxis des Regierens in Westeuropa*, [w:] Müller W., Strøm K. (eds.), *Koalitionsregierungen in Westeuropa*, Wyd. Signum 1997, s. 705–750; Müller W., Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 2000, vol 37, s. 309–333.

⁹ Riker W., *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.

¹⁰ Thies M., Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments, “*American Journal of Political Science*” 2001, vol 45, s. 580–598.

¹¹ von Neumann I., Morgenstern O., *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1953.

¹² von Neumann I., Morgenstern O., *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1953.

¹³ Riker W., *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.

¹⁴ Gamson W., A Theory of Coalition Formation, “*American Sociological Review*” 1981, vol 26, s. 373–382.

of political preferences, they typically resort to the option of forming a government coalition with a triumphant status (having obtained the majority of seats in the legislature) and the least number of potential participants¹⁵. This criterion ensures that individual members of governmental coalitions get the best possible political benefits and roles. Instead, the more parliamentary support exceeds the required minimum of a triumphant status (50% plus one MP in the Legislature), the shorter the term of a government coalition is, and therefore political actors tend to consider this option less important¹⁶. A slightly modified version of the minimal victory hypothesis was proposed by R. Axelrod, who in the study «Conflict of Interest»¹⁷ began to simultaneously investigate the level of the ideological conflicts, typical of various governmental coalitions. Based on his findings, the scientist argued that politicians and parties, attracted by governmental positions, were interested not only in maximizing their political benefits, but also in reducing the operating costs of forming and supporting government coalitions. Thus, R. Axelrod suggested that politicians and parties should form exclusively minimum-winning and ideologically-linked government coalitions, i.e. coalitions composed exclusively of ideologically related and close political forces. Another theorist expressed the same idea within the framework of a non-institutional approach, that is A. DeSwaan., who in the study «Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation»¹⁸ argued that political parties, like other political actors, are making an attempt to form minimum-winning governmental coalitions with the lowest ideological range and the ideological distance between the parties. In general, this presupposes that a non-institutional approach to explaining peculiarities of forming coalition governments and the cooperation of their participants in multiparty conditions leads to several figurative assumptions that: potential coalition government cabinets are likely to be formed, being formed as minimally as possible; potential coalition governments are likely to form when they are constituted as minimum-winning and ideologically-linked government coalitions; potential coalition governments are likely to form if they are expected to be ideologically compact, minimum-winning coalitions; potential coalition governments are likely to occur when they centre around a party or parties with centrist / middle ideological positioning.

In contrast, proponents of the institutional approach have traditionally claimed that the outcomes of the forming government coalitions process are largely a function of certain norms, circumstances, and institutions, determine a peculiar ability to form certain types of coalition governments. Accordingly, some scientists, in particular M. Laver and N. Schofield¹⁹, argue that in forming coalition governments political institutions need to be regarded as constraining factors in coalition bargaining. Others claim instead that political institutions are not only

¹⁵ Marradi A., *Italy: from Centrism to Crisis of the Center-Left Coalitions*, [w:] Browne E., Dreijmanis J. (eds.), *Government Coalitions in Western Democracies*, Wyd. Longman 1982, s. 49.

¹⁶ Norpoth H., *The German Federal Republic*, [w:] Browne E., Dreijmanis J. (eds.), *Government Coalitions in Western Democracies*, Wyd. Longman 1982.

¹⁷ Axelrod R., *Conflict of Interest*, Wyd. Markham 1970.

¹⁸ De Swaan A., *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation*, Wyd. Elsevier 1973.

¹⁹ Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1990.

limiting but also directive, thus affecting the entire chain of processes of formation, performance and responsibility. On the whole, such an institutionally determined approach states that the coalition governments formation and the cooperation of their members in multiparty conditions and within the specific environment parameters are necessarily caused by a direct impact of certain norms and institutions. In addition, researchers mention that if political actors (political figures, parties, election coalitions, and voters) are motivated by the posts and pursuit of their own political goals, the influence of certain norms and institutions on the political behaviour of those political actors should be similar to the nature of such norms and institutes. Thus, given the variability of different norms and political institutions structuring, it is necessary to discuss the variability of the structuring of different institutionally determined theories and models of forming coalition governments and the cooperation of their participants in multiparty conditions. However, even irrespective of the absence of a peculiar systemic institutional theory, and in the context of their variability, it can be argued that, in one way or another, it is certain institutional factors that determine consequences of different processes of forming coalition governments.

In this regard K. Strom, J. Budge and M. Laver in the study “*Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies*”²⁰, and similarly M. Laver and N. Schofield in the work “*Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*”²¹ claim that from the perspective of the institutional approach, several theories and models of forming coalition governments and their participants in multiparty environments should be pointed out. According to one theory, institutional rules can assist members of a particular coalition government in status quo situations while negotiating a particular coalition government formation and prolongation, thus making certain coalition governments more credible and stable in the event of reforms. Consequently, it is not institutionally excluded that at the time of a new coalition government negotiating it is more effective to retain the previous coalition government as acting, since it is impossible to predict the outcomes of how the process of a new coalition government forming. According to K. Strom, it stipulates that it is the institutional factors that add market importance to governments that are no longer supported by the Legislature, yet political actors cannot be certain whether new options for governmental coalition will arise. In terms of another theory, applying rules of coalition governments early termination in particular political systems is of great institutional importance. M. Laver and N. Schofield²² state that ruling / dominant parties often have considerable control over the timing of the coalition government cabinet «termination» and may therefore determine the appropriateness of forming a new coalition government. This idea is supplemented by the fact that exactly the ruling or dominant party is able to take advantage of institutional rules, enabling it to affect the coalition government

²⁰ Strom K., Budge J., Laver M., Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies, “*American Journal of Political Science*” 1994, vol 38, s. 303–335.

²¹ Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1990.

²² Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1990, s. 213.

performance and thus its responsibility. This is of utter importance when such a party is capable of influencing ministerial reshuffles in a coalition government or, most interestingly, initiating dissolution of parliament and announcing early parliamentary elections (which is inherent in some multi-party democracies). In this context, it is apparent that the institutional approach to the issue of forming coalition governments and the cooperation of their participants in multiparty conditions leads to several figurative assumptions, in particular that: a coalition government, formed by certain parties, yet for some reason having terminated its powers, is most likely to preserve its party composition and to be re-formed under the conditions of the current composition of the parliament; a coalition government formed as an interim parliament in the face of a crisis of the previous coalition government and unchanged composition of the Legislature is most likely to transform into a permanent coalition government, rather than an interim government; the proto-coalition, expected to contain an antisystemic political party, is hardly unlikely to transform into a coalition government; a proto-coalition, which contains a formateur or informant of government forming is highly likely to transform into a coalition government; the likelihood of forming a coalition government increases due to simplifying rules for the introduction of governments into office, that is, the rules on parliamentary investiture vote for the new government.

In this respect L. Martin and R. Stevenson in the study “*A Unified Model of Cabinet Formation and Survival*”²³ argued that the likelihood of coalition government formation increases together with the rising confidence of political actors in the institutional stability of such a government, this fact presupposing that political actors tend to prefer long-awaited governmental coalitions or relatively long-surviving instances of governmental coalitions. In addition, the abovementioned concludes that government coalitions, expected to be formed by ideologically close parties rather than distant parties, that is, coalitions that are thought to be more ideologically compact rather than divisive, are regarded as more long-standing. On the other hand, in the words of the institutional approach advocates, party or non-institutional determinants are less relevant, since being absolutely identical for each expected coalition option in any hypothetical composition of parliament, the effective number of parties or the degree of parliament polarization is obviously not a decisive factor in predicting coalition governments. Respectively this stipulates generalizations according to which the following is theoretically possible: coalition governments are more likely to be formed in case of ideological distance reduction as well as diminishing differences between their members; minority coalitions are more likely to cause ideological divisions in parliamentary opposition; coalition governments are more likely to be formed if their potential participants control the majority in the parliament; coalition governments are highly unlikely to be formed, but such a possibility still exists provided one party itself controls the majority in the legislature²⁴.

²³ Martin L., Stevenson R., *A Unified Model of Cabinet Formation and Survival*, Unpublished manuscript 1995.

²⁴ Martin L., Stevenson R., *An Empirical Model of Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. University of Rochester 1996.

As a result, the conclusion arises that the two groups of approaches to the issue of forming coalition governments in multiparty conditions generates a lot of controversy and mutual exceptions. Therefore, it is justified not to contemplate different models of coalition governments formation in opposition to each other, but rather identify the most significant and even common peculiarities of negotiating coalition governments process. It requires appealing to the common formal features of the process of coalition governments negotiation and separation of different models of cabinet portfolio allocation between governmental coalition partners (in addition, at times it is appropriate to resort to variable methods of maintaining coalition government stability in multiparty environments, both in the so-called open (if parties do not belong to the extreme parts of the ideological spectrum) and closed (if the parties belong to the left or right extremity of the ideological spectrum) coalitions.

In virtually all countries with a multiparty system, and coalition governments model, the negotiation process involves the same steps and stages from the very point of announcing the results of parliamentary (rarely presidential and parliamentary) elections up to the stage of nominating and approving a new coalitional cabinet. These steps, with minor modifications, follow a linear sequence: deciding on forming a government coalition; approval of a government coalition political programme; allocation of cabinet offices among government coalition partners; the selection of candidates for the posts of Prime Minister (if this has not been done in advance), Vice Prime Ministers, Ministers, Deputy Ministers, junior ministers and other senior government officials on the quotas of the forming parties.

Although parties informally negotiate and have certain arrangements before the parliamentary and / or presidential elections (even in the form of proto-coalitions or electoral coalitions), whereas formally, the process of coalition government formation begins only following the election results announcement. After the votes are counted and the number of party seats in the parliament is known, serious coalition negotiations on government formation can begin. In addition, the previous informal negotiations between party leaders generally do not concern either the portfolio allocation among coalition partners or the specific content of a government coalition political programme. Hence, the first step following the election results is a decision on government coalition formation. The main purpose of such a step is to identify potential partners to form an effective government coalition, capable of obtaining (at best) the majority in parliament and forming a new government cabinet. The next step is to negotiate a government coalition political programme. In most cases, members of a government coalition may differ in important programmatic issues. Therefore, after declaring an intention to form a government coalition, the next mandatory step is to select a political platform that is acceptable to all government coalition partners. The process of political reconciliation is complex and often does not meet all its participants' expectations, requiring compromises and concessions in debates. However, this stage is extremely important for the formation of a new viable coalition government and its effective further cooperation with the parliament. The third

step in forming a coalition government involves allocating cabinet portfolios between coalition partners. At this stage of the negotiations, important key posts in the government cabinet are allocated. Negotiations on key government positions are often held after the established models that help fairly allocate cabinet offices among government coalition members (see below). After the key posts in the coalition government are allocated among the coalition partners, the final stage of the process coalition government formation begins, i.e. the selection of candidates for these positions from parties. Frequently, individual parties are free to choose candidates for certain posts. In other cases, the choice of individual ministers is agreed with the coalition partners. Really seldom, such appointments are made by the central executive authority. However, M.Laver and K.Shepsle²⁵ point out, that irrespective of specific selection procedures, ministers are almost always elected from the politicians or administrators, having a lot of weight in the respective parties.

The four steps discussed above constitute the basic coalition government formation model in any multiparty democracy. They are often regarded as independent processes, predominantly occurring in a linear sequence. However, some analysts, including T. Bergman, have warned that the process of forming a government may not always proceed linearly²⁶, because various stages can overlap or merge, complicating a seemingly simplified four-stage model. Undoubtedly, the first stage, being intention to create a government coalition in practice often coincides with the second stage of elaborating a government coalition political programme²⁷. This is obvious because the coherence of the political parties' programmes is a weighty determinant of viability and effectiveness of both the government coalition and the cabinet. Moreover, the second stage can often combine with the stage of allocation of portfolios. In some cases a coalition partner is more interested in ensuring his fellow party members obtain portfolios than in the content of the government's political agenda. This partner can later «exchange» some of his political influence, lying in achieving certain political goals by governmental means, for a better allocation of offices in a government coalition.

Of equal research interest is the problem of the fundamentals of portfolio allocation and ministerial management in coalition cabinets in multiparty conditions. However, while party coalitions can easily agree on the principles and compromise of coalition policy, they are typically unable to trust each other's ministers, in particular to pursue a common coalition policy as practical as possible. For example, if the efforts of ministers from a particular coalition party significantly affect the efficiency of government policy through jurisdiction of such ministers, delegation of ministerial posts and their allocation among coalition parties becomes a problematic issue. The scientific literature typically identifies three ways how government

²⁵ Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and Breaking Governments*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996, s. 249.

²⁶ Bergman T., *Sweden: When Minority Cabinets are the Rule and Majority Coalitions the Exception*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 193–230.

²⁷ De Winter L., *Belgium: On Government Agreements, Evangelists, Followers and Heretics*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 300–355.

coalition partners can control each other to reduce the so-called «loss of agency» problem when each coalition member is at risk of being over-delegated by any other coalition member. L. Martin and G. Vanberg²⁸ are convinced, that the first way is that government coalition partners are to use the political process on the parliamentary arena as a tool to increase knowledge about each other. W. Müller, K. Strom²⁹ and M. Thies³⁰ argue that the second way is boiled down to the situation when junior ministers from one party can help to watch coalition cabinet members from another party. Finally, according to M. Hallerberg³¹, D.-H. Kim and G. Loewenberg³², the third strategy suggests parliamentary committees and political parties to control coalition governments ministers in order to influence their stability results. In this regard M. Laver and K. Shepsle³³ claim, that when each particular coalition government party exactly knows the perfect political stance of its partner, the «mutual control» can lead to more stable results of government performance.

Against this backdrop, it is advisable to single out several common and most important principles of the portfolio allocation in coalition governments. According to the first principle, the prime minister's post typically goes to a political party with the most votes, not necessarily in the parliament, but among all government parties. The most common practice of coalition government formation is to assign the prime minister's post to the strongest government coalition partner, since the party leader with the most electoral support is usually appointed by the prime minister of the new coalition government. W. Müller points out that this is rather an informal arrangement than a formal rule, being nevertheless observed in most countries with a multi-party system³⁴. The second principle suggests that the second-largest government coalition partner is given the post of deputy prime minister or speaker of the lower house of parliament. Therefore, the appointment of a prime minister, being the representative of the strongest coalition partner does not mean that the party receives absolute power in the administrative process. The second or third-strongest party in the coalition government usually receives a quota for the position of Vice Prime Minister or Speaker of Parliament / lower house of parliament. This makes it impossible to concentrate power in the hands of one political force. The third principle states that the most important positions are allocated among the strongest partners in the government coalition. In particular, allocation of such important positions as the Minister of Finance, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of the Interior Affairs and

²⁸ Martin L., Vanberg G., Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review, *"American Political Science Review"* 2004, vol 99, s. 93–106.

²⁹ Müller W., Strom K., *Schl.: Koalitionsregierungen und die Praxis des Regierens in Westeuropa*, [w:] Müller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Koalitionsregierungen in Westeuropa*, Wyd. Signum 1997, s. 736.

³⁰ Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments, *"American Journal of Political Science"* 2001, vol 45, s. 580–598.

³¹ Hallerberg M., *The Role of Parliamentary Committees in the Budgetary Process within Europe*, [w:] Strauch R., von Hagen J. (eds.), *Institutions, Politics and Fiscal Policy*, Wyd. Kluwer 2000, s. 87–106.

³² Kim D.-H., Loewenberg G., The Role of Parliamentary Committees in Coalition Governments: Keeping Tabs on Coalition Partners in the German Bundestag, *"Comparative Political Studies"* 2005, vol 38, s. 1104–1129.

³³ Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and Breaking Governments*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

³⁴ Müller W., *Austria: Tight Coalitions and Stable Government*, [w:] Müller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.

the Minister of Defense get special attention³⁵. In most cases each office is negotiated separately. However, in some countries, there are no clear patterns of government portfolio allocation. The fourth principle determines that less important portfolios are distributed in proportion to the electoral support of government parties, and weaker government coalition partners typically receive slightly more representation. Respectively, the allocation of less important portfolios would encourage smaller parties to cooperate with the new coalition government. This is especially evident given that since most (if not all) of the top government positions are taken by members of the strongest parties, smaller coalition parties typically receive a larger share of «second tier» positions³⁶, which, in words of P. Mitchell³⁷, ensures them even more representation than they can count on based on the number of votes in the election³⁸. This model is normally referred to as the «relative weakness effect» and is quite popular with small governmental parties. The fifth principle typically boils down to the fact that the portfolio allocation in government coalitions is usually in line with party interests. In this regard, T. Saalfeld points out that, apart from proportionality, the portfolio allocation traditionally takes into account the specific political interests of coalition-forming parties³⁹. As a result, if a party is interested in a particular policy area, representatives of that party often get appointed to a particular ministry. E. Damgaard believes that, in practice, quite widespread is the portfolio allocation by political importance to parties represented in government, as it is expected to make governments more stable and efficient⁴⁰. Finally, the sixth principle states that portfolio allocation reflects the desire to balance power and representation between government coalition partners. In the end, this means that the process of allocation of ministerial posts is based on the principle of balancing or equality of government coalition parties. It is the natural desire of any governmental coalition that wants to maintain unity in its ranks. In addition, government coalition members should see that their contribution is appreciated and they play a role in the policy-making process.

In addition, there exist numerous mechanisms to achieve balance between coalition parties in the coalition government. These are mechanisms, applied by coalition governments to balance power and representation between government coalition members in government, which is certainly a factor of increasing the the coalition government stability. Despite splitting government portfolios between different parties in a governmental coalition being one of the

³⁵ Saalfeld T., *Germany: Stable Parties, Chancellor Democracy, and the Art of Informal Settlement*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 67–70.

³⁶ Muller W., *Austria: Tight Coalitions and Stable Government*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.

³⁷ Mitchell P., *Ireland: From Single-Party to Coalition Rule*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.

³⁸ Damgaard E., *Denmark: The Life and Death of Government Coalitions*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 231–263.

³⁹ Saalfeld T., *Germany: Stable Parties, Chancellor Democracy, and the Art of Informal Settlement*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 67–70.

⁴⁰ Damgaard E., *Denmark: The Life and Death of Government Coalitions*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 231–263.

most logical ways to balance governmental power, this method has obvious limitations. The main point is that the number of ministerial posts in the government is limited, and therefore this tool is not always appropriate to achieve a representative balance. In contrast, political science and practice have elaborated some more sophisticated methods of delegating powers within coalition governments, involving sharing control over government positions, either by creating additional positions within existing portfolios, or by dividing traditional areas of responsibility into narrower segments of government activity, where no coalition government partner has exclusive control over a particular area⁴¹.

The toolkit for creating additional positions within existing portfolios can usually be implemented through appointment of junior ministers, the appointment of ministers without portfolios, or through creation of new ministries and hence new posts. One of the most common mechanisms for ensuring balance between coalition parties is the appointment of junior ministers (secretaries of state, deputy ministers with broad powers) to important ministries. So, if the Ministry of Finance is headed by a party A representative, then the junior ministers within that ministry may be from party B and party C. Some junior ministers may have their own areas of responsibility and perform broad supervision, while others are assigned to specific policy areas within the ministry that they significantly influence. In addition, the procedure for appointing junior ministers varies from country to country. For example, in some cases junior ministers are only appointed to certain important ministries. However, in other cases, each minister receives several junior ministers (one post for each coalition party in each ministry)⁴². In any case, junior ministers, acting as a counterbalance, has several advantages. In his study, Muller argues that not only does it help to balance the government representation distribution between coalition parties, but provides «an important mechanism to ensure execution of coalition agreements»⁴³. Another mechanism of balancing power between government coalition members is creation of ministerial positions without portfolios. For instance, this method is widespread in Sweden, where ministers are often responsible for a particular policy area but do not have control over a particular institutional apparatus⁴⁴. Among the advantages of this approach is the fact that negotiators get more freedom to satisfy the coalition parties' interests in the course of the coalition government formation. However, the visible disadvantage of this method is that portfolio-less ministers often face considerable difficulty in implementing their initiatives as they do not have the same institutional support as ministers as such. Finally, another mechanism of balance within coalition governments is to create new ministries and new government positions.

⁴¹ Saalfeld T., *Germany: Stable Parties, Chancellor Democracy, and the Art of Informal Settlement*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 67–70.

⁴² Muller W., *Austria: Tight Coalitions and Stable Government*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 108–109; De Winter L., *Belgium: On Government Agreements, Evangelists, Followers and Heretics*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 325–326.

⁴³ Muller W., Strom K., *Coalition Governance in Western Europe: An Introduction*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 24–25.

⁴⁴ Bergman T., *Sweden: When Minority Cabinets are the Rule and Majority Coalitions the Exception*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 193–230.

In Denmark, for example, the number and jurisdiction of major government ministries is not fixed. They may be modified to take into account the interests of government parties. Therefore, during the formation of a government coalition, the structure of the cabinet can be bargained, which considerably increases the flexibility of the government-forming process⁴⁵. Less a radical example is Ireland, where the number and jurisdiction of government ministries is constitutionally enshrined. However, during negotiations to form a government coalition in 1994, an office of «senior junior minister» was created specifically for a small coalition party that required two ministerial posts, though the coalition could de jure allocate only one office⁴⁶.

In contrast, the tools for dividing traditional areas of responsibility into narrower segments of government activity traditionally occur due to the mechanisms of joint control over certain ministries as well as application of the so-called system of grades. Coordinating ministerial posts is an important way of allocating key positions among coalition members within the coalition government. For example, in Sweden, where junior ministers do not perform the counterbalancing function, some important ministerial positions are held by several full ministers. T. Bergman points out that this was the case, for example, with the Ministry of Finance and Budget in the coalition governments of Sweden in 1976 and 1979⁴⁷. Belgium yields another interesting example: there are no junior ministers whatsoever, yet two ministers from different parties are often appointed for «major ministries». J. Nousiainen states in this regard that «each of these ministers receives jurisdiction within the relevant ministry, but there is no clear hierarchical relationship between the ministers.» After all, some states have developed fairly sophisticated scoring systems that allow each coalition party to be properly represented in the new coalition government. Such a system, for example, was used in Romania, where coalition partners agreed on a kind of «exchange rate» in 2004. According to this system, one full ministerial position corresponded to three secretaries of state (equivalent to junior ministers), and so on. A much more complicated example is Belgium, where the rule of thumb for the allocation of government posts has been in use since 1980. Under this rule, each government office receives a specific weight: three points for the prime minister, two for a ministerial office, as well as for the posts of speakers of Lower House and Senate, one point respectively for Secretary of State (junior minister)⁴⁸. Accordingly, while negotiating, coalition parties first of all set the same number of points for the Flemish and French-speaking communities, and then distribute points between each party based on its electoral support, later party leaders take turns selecting the desired portfolios (the strongest party enjoys the right of first choice,

⁴⁵ Damgaard E., *Denmark: The Life and Death of Government Coalitions*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 250.

⁴⁶ Mitchell P., *Ireland: From Single-Party to Coalition Rule*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 143.

⁴⁷ Bergman T., *Sweden: When Minority Cabinets are the Rule and Majority Coalitions the Exception*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 217.

⁴⁸ De Winter L., *Belgium: On Government Agreements, Evangelists, Followers and Heretics*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 333.

whereas a party with the fewest votes is the last to choose). At the end of the selection process, a second round of negotiations begins, during which parties can «exchange» their portfolios.

On the whole, the study found that coalition governments, being the norm for a country with multiparty systems, are at first glance a fairly unified phenomenon. And this is true in functional and macroscopic terms. However, institutionally and non-institutionally, coalition governments differ microscopically, in particular on the basis of the use of different formation models and different mechanisms of their members' cooperation. This generally presupposes that coalition governments still need diversified discussing, particularly through different approaches to explaining them given various national peculiarities of their practical implementation. In some cases, governments are more predetermined by nominal rules and institutions, whereas in other cases they are predominantly depend on party-determined factors.

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